Abstract: Concurrent signatures scheme is an effective way to solve the problem of fair exchange without the help of any trusted third party. Until now, all concurrent signatures are based on traditional cryptosystems, but the emergence of quantum computing poses a severe threat to the security of classic public-key cryptosystems. More and more attentions are being paid to lattice-based cryptosystems, which is one of the candidate cryptosystems against the attacks from quantum computing. In this paper, we present a new formal model of multi-party concurrent signatures scheme and a lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. The scheme has comparative advantages in both efficiency and security over the existing concurrent signatures schemes based on traditional cryptosystem. In particular, our scheme is constructed based on constant-size ring signatures, and thus we have solved the open problem: how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures, which was proposed by Tonien et al. (2006) .
Introduction
In 2004, Chen et al. (2004) firstly proposed the concept of concurrent signatures scheme. In their scheme, any third party is unable to determine who generated the signature before the most important information (keystone) was announced. Because each of the two signers can generate the signature alone. Once the keystone was announced by the signer, the two signatures would bind to their real signers at the same time. In 2007, Tonien et al. (2006) proposed the concept of multi-party concurrent signatures scheme, their scheme is constructed by using the combination of bilinear map and ring signature scheme. At the end, Tonien et al. (2006) proposed an open problem: how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures. It was not solved till now, to the best of our knowledge. In 2008, Shieh (2008) pointed out that the Tonien's multi-programme was of some security flaws, and they proposed a fair multi-party concurrent signature which not only satisfied the original concept of concurrent signature, but also ensured the fairness.
Facing with the security threat that the classic public-key cryptosystems suffered from emerging quantum computing, it is urgent to develop new public-key cryptosystems. Lattice-based cryptography is being a very active and increasingly important branch of cryptography. Lattice-based cryptography is getting more attentions because of its higher efficient computation and may be one of the secure cryptosystems in post-quantum era.
Since the seminal work of Ajtai (1999) , many good lattice-based primitives were proposed in the last decade (Alwen and Peikert, 2009; Gentry et al., 2008; Kawachi et al., 2008; Peikert, 2009) . Gentry et al. (2008) established the method that lattice problems can be used to construct a kind of trapdoor primitives, a preimage samplable function (PSF), which is a basic tool for constructing lattice-based digital signatures scheme, was developed. Recently, a new technique, Bonsai tree, was developed in Cash et al. (2010) , which allows one to use a short basis of a given lattice to derive a new short basis of a related lattice in a secure way. Agrawal et al. (2010) gave a variety of the bonsai trees algorithms to construct a HIBE scheme in the standard model. The development of lattice-based digital signature scheme provides a new way to design lattice-based concurrent signatures scheme.
Our contribution
In this paper, we propose a lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. The security of our scheme is based on a hard problem of lattices, which is called small integer solution (SIS) problem. Our multi-party concurrent signature is unforgeable in the random oracle model and is of fairness. Our scheme is the first lattice-based concurrent signatures scheme, to the best of our knowledge. The distinguish feature of our multi-party concurrent signatures scheme is that it is constructed by a constant-size ring signatures, thus we have solved the open problem: how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures, which was proposed by Tonien et al. (2006) . Our concurrent signatures scheme is expected to be secure under the quantum computing. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes some needed knowledge about lattice cryptography. Section 3 is a formal model of our multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures and its security. Section 4 gives our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. Section 5 is devoted to the security analysis of our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. Section 6 is about the efficiency of our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. Section 7 concludes this paper. 
Preliminaries

Notations
For an n × m matrix A = [a 1 ,
Lattice
A lattice L is the set of all integer linear combinations of some linearly independent vectors v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , ···, v m , usually it is denoted by ( )
where v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , ···, v m are called a basis of L. Several different sets of linearly independent vectors may indicate the same lattice. Then these sets of vectors are all the basis of the lattice. For a given lattice, it is a NP problem to look for its shortest non-zero vector (Ajtai, 1999) .
Random modular lattice
Our concurrent signatures scheme is mainly based on a specific dimensional integer modular lattice family, which is defined in Cash et al. (2010) .
Definition 1 (Gentry et al., 2008) : For a given matrix ,
and q, m, n are specific integers, define:
From those formulas we can get ( ) ( )mod ,
where t is an arbitrary
Discrete Gaussian distribution
For an arbitrary r > 0, a Gaussian distribution over R n lattice centre at c with deviation parameter r is defined as follows:
For an arbitrary c ∈ R n , r > 0, and a n dimension lattice Λ, the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ is defined as: 
The preimage sampleble on lattice
We introduce a family of single PSFs on lattice: TrapGen, SampleD, SamplePre (Gentry et al., 2008) , and an expanded function: ExtBasis, which are used to construct our signature generating function. We suppose the Gaussian parameter From the above algorithm ExtBasis, we construct a more general lattice basis expanding algorithm, which will be used in our signature scheme.
• GenExtBasis(S i , A): Let q ≥ 2, m ≥ 5n log q, take as input 
A lattice-based signature scheme
The hash-and-sign paradigm for signature schemes is a basic way for signature. A signature scheme is built upon a collection of trapdoor collision-resistant hash functions given by (TrapGen, SampleDom, SamplePre) in Gentry et al. (2008) , and a probabilistic signature scheme is also presented. The scheme will be needed in our multi-party concurrent signatures scheme, and we will use it as our underling signature scheme, so we give a brief description here.
, where a describes a function f a and t is its trapdoor. The verification key is a and the signing key is t.
• Sign (t, m) . choose r ← {0, 1} k at random, let σ ← SamplePre(t, H(m || r)), and output (r, σ).
• Verify (a, m, (r, σ) ). if σ ∈ D n and r ∈ {0, 1} k and f a (σ) = H(m || r), then accept. Else, reject. Gentry et al., 2008) : The scheme described above is strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (SUF-CMA-secure).
Proposition 1 (Proposition 5.2 in
A new efficient multi-party concurrent signatures scheme and its security
A general signatures scheme based on lattice is given in Gentry et al. (2008) . A multi-party concurrent signatures scheme is given in Tonien et al. (2006) . Here, we give a new efficient multi-party concurrent signatures scheme which is based on constant-size ring signatures. Our aim is to solve the open problem: how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures, which was proposed by Tonien et al. (2006) . Our multi-party concurrent signature is very efficient compared with the existed ones. Our multi-party concurrent signature based on constant-size ring signatures consists of the following algorithms.
1 SETUP(n). Take as input n the security parameter, the algorithm outputs signer i's public/private key pairs 〈pk i , sk i 〉 (i = 1, 2, ···, l), a description of the message space M, keystone space G, keystone fixed space K, and two secure hash function H and H 1 . Note the two hash function may be the same or different, that depends on the hash algorithm in the underling signature scheme and ring signature scheme to be used in the following.
2 KeystoneFix. Suppose that there is an initiator in a multi-party concurrent signature, his or her duty is to initiate a multi-party concurrent signature, and arrange the signers who will take part in this signature, and give an order for all the signers. The initiator takes charge collecting the relevant signatures from all the signers and distributing the signatures to all the signers. Of course, every signer in the multi-party concurrent signature may be the initiator. In this paper, to ease the notation, we will suppose that the ordered set of all the signers are {singer i | i = 1, 2, ···, l}, and the initiator is signer j (1 ≤ j ≤ l). 
∈ as his or her keystone fix on message
, finally, signer i sends his or her keystone fix K i and the signature message M i to the initiator signer j (1 ≤ j ≤ l). 
RingVerify pk pk σ y to check the validity of the ring signature σ on message y, where RingVerify(·) is the ring signatures verification algorithm corresponding to the ring signature algorithm RingSign(·). It outputs 'accept' if the verification algorithm is passed, otherwise outputs 'reject'.
5 KeystonesRelease. For every signer i (1 ≤ i ≤ l), releases his or her keystone k si ∈ G to the initiator signer j, if the ambiguous signature σ is accepted by using verification algorithm
. 
AVERIFY pk pk M M σ to check the correctness of the ambiguous signature ;
σ If all the verification passed, outputs 'accept', otherwise outputs 'reject'.
A fair multi-party concurrent signature should satisfy the following security requirements:
• Correctness. If a multi-party concurrent signature has been generated correctly by invoking the above algorithms, then it should pass the multi-party concurrent signature verification algorithm with overwhelming probability.
• Unforgeability. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial adversary to forge a valid concurrent signatures without the appropriate private key is negligible under chosen message attack. There are two different cases that we need to consider:
• Outside attacker. For any probabilistic polynomial adversary who is out of the set of the signers, the advantage to forge a valid multi-party concurrent signature is negligible.
• Inside attacker. For any signer i as an inside adversary, the advantage to forge a valid signature in the name of any other signer is negligible.
• Ambiguity. Before the individual keystone k si is released, any one cannot prove that the signer i is the actual signer of an ambiguous (ring) signature. Instead, the only thing that any one can be sure is that the actual signer belongs to the group signers.
• Fairness. We require that any valid ambiguous signatures generated using the same group keystone fixed (K 1 , ···, K l ) will all become binding after all the keystones (k s1 , ···, k sl ) are released. Hence, any signer cannot be left in a position where a keystone binds his signature to him whilst some of other signers' signatures are not bound to them.
Remark 1:
In the above multi-party concurrent signatures scheme, we use an original keystone as the common input, the secret keystone is really a signature on the hash of the original keystone, the key stone fix is the hash of the secret keystone and the message. So in our scheme the secret keystone has a very special meaning, which is very different from the existing concurrent signatures scheme.
Remark 2:
In the above multi-party concurrent signatures scheme, the initiator signer j (1 ≤ j ≤ l) represents all signers to sign an ambiguous (ring) signature on message M i ∈ {0, 1} * (i = 1, 2, ···, l) by using a constant-size ring signature, so this is very different from the existing scheme. Our multi-party concurrent signature is 1 2 ( , , , , , ),
while the multi-party concurrent signature in Chen et al. (2004) and Tonien et al. (2006) is σ = (gk, F, ik 1 , ···, ik l , σ 1 , ···, σ l ). Compared the above two signatures, we can see that our signature is of constant size except the key stones, while the signature size in Chen et al. (2004) and Tonien et al. (2006) is a linear function of the number of the signers even except the key stones. The size of our concurrent signature is very short, thus we have solved the open problem: how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures, which was proposed by Tonien et al. (2006) .
Lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme
In this section, we will describe our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. Our aim is to present a secure multi-party concurrent signatures scheme that will be survived in the quantum computing era. Our belief comes from the folk that lattice-based cryptosystems are secure against the quantum computing. At least, there is no quantum computing algorithm that can solve the difficulty lattice-based problem at present.
Our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme follows the scheme described in Section 3. We use a lattice-based signature scheme in Gentry et al. (2008) to generate the keystones, and we design a new lattice-based ring signature scheme to generate the ambiguous (ring) signature, which is a constant-size ring signature. The scheme is inspired by Cash et al. (2010) and Peikert (2009) .
Our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signature is as follows:
1 SETUP(n). Take as input n the security parameter, the algorithm outputs signer i's public/private key pairs 〈pk 2 KeystoneFix. Suppose that there is an initiator in a multi-party concurrent signature, to ease the notation we will suppose that the ordered set of all the signers are {singer i | i = 1, 2, ···, l}, and the initiator is signer j (1 ≤ j ≤ l). 
will pass the keystone verification algorithm with overwhelming probability.
Unforgeability analysis
Conclusion 2: Our scheme is strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack in the random oracle model, assuming that H is collision resistant and ISIS q,km,r , SIS q,km,2r is hard.
Proof: Our proof constitutes two parts. In the first part, we will consider outside adversary, that is, the attacker comes from the outside of the set of all signers; in the second part, we will consider inside adversary, that is, the attacker comes from the inside of the set of all signers.
Firstly, let A be an outside PPT adversary under chosen message attack, whose aim is to forge a valid lattice-based multi-party concurrent signature. To forge a valid concurrent signature, the adversary should at least forge a valid ambiguous signature. Suppose that , || || R A e y e r lm = ≤ under chosen message attack in the random model. This is exactly equivalent to forge a signature for the latticed-based signature scheme mentioned above in Section 2, by the Proposition 1 in Section 2 we have known that it is strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack for the lattice-based signature scheme with public key A R and secret key B R . Thus, we can conclude that our proposed concurrent signatures scheme is also strong existential unforgeability against the outside attacker under chosen message attack in the random oracle model. Secondly, let A be an inside PPT adversary under chosen message attack in the random model, whose aim is to forge a valid lattice-based multi-party keystone for other signers. To be more clearer, we suppose the adversary A is signer j 0 (1 ≤ j 0 ≤ l), whose aim is to forge a valid keystone 0 B by the Proposition 1 in Section 2 we have known the signature scheme is strong existential unforgeability under chosen message attack. Thus, we can conclude that our proposed concurrent signatures scheme is also strong existential unforgeability against the inside attacker under chosen message attack in the random oracle model.
Ambiguity analysis
Conclusion 3: The proposed lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme has the ambiguity property. ( , , , , , , , ),
where the initiator signers j's private key B j is used. But we should note that this ambiguous signatures is just a ring signature, that is, all signers can use their private keys to sign this signature, that is, any signer i can represent the whole group to sign this ambiguous signature ( , ) σ e y = on message M i (i = 1, 2, ···, l). This is because that the secret key can be computed by either B R ← GenExtBasis(B j , A r ) or ( , ).
Here, B j and B i are the private key of signer j and signer i. Thus, the ambiguous signatures ( , ) σ e y = can be signed by every member of the ring, so it is difficult to tell who is the real signer, so the ambiguous signatures ( , ) σ e y = keeps ambiguous before the keystone is released. So the proposed scheme satisfies ambiguity property.
Concurrency analysis
Conclusion 4: The proposed lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme has the concurrency property.
∈ are binding with their signer i (i = 1, 2, ···, l) at the same time. Thus, the proposed scheme satisfies fairness property.
Efficiency analysis
In this section, we give an efficiency analysis of our lattice-based multi-party scheme. Table 1 is about the sizes of the public key, private key and the multi-party concurrent signature. Table 1 The sizes of public, private key and multi-party concurrent signature Public key sizes lmn log q bits Private key sizes lm 2 log q bits multi-party concurrent signature sizes 3(m + lm) log q bits
From Table 1 , we can see that the size of our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures is 3n log q bit except the key stones, the size of key stones is 3lm log q bits, the size of our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signature is a constant except the keystone, the size of key stones is a linear function of l the number of signers. Our multi-party concurrent signature is of constant size except the key stones, while the sizes of the multi-party concurrent signature in Chen et al. (2004) and Tonien et al. (2006) are a linear function of the number of the signers. So our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signature is very short in signature size.
Lattices have a number of rather unique efficiency and implementation advantages. For instance, bilinear-map cryptosystems tend to be convenient to work with on paper but it hides rather complex elliptic-curve machinery that must be securely implemented in any physical implementation. In lattice-based cryptography, the situation is reversed: schemes and proofs tend to be more complex, but implementations require only small-number arithmetic and basic linear algebra. So our scheme is very efficient.
Conclusions
In this paper, inspired by both the Shieh's multi-party concurrent signatures scheme (Shieh, 2008; Tonien et al., 2006) and the Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan's lattice-based signature scheme (Gentry et al., 2008) , we construct a new formal model of multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures, and a lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme. Our lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme is expected to resist the attack from quantum computing. The signature scheme has comparative advantages in both security and efficiency over the existing traditional multi-party concurrent signatures schemes based on the bilinear pairing problem. We use a very different way for keystone and keystone fix generating algorithm from the previous ones, which makes our scheme unique. Our scheme is the first lattice-based multi-party concurrent signatures scheme to the best of our knowledge. Our scheme also has solved the open problem proposed in Tonien et al. (2006) , which is how to construct a multi-party concurrent signatures scheme based on constant-size ring signatures.
